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Abstract: Isaiah Berlin famously attacked a view he called historical inevitability. 
He believed that a causal view of history would entail the adoption of an extreme 
deterministic position – a kind of determinism which would rule out the possibility 
of free will, turning moral responsibility into an empty notion. His thesis was also 
based on the assumption that historians are not just chroniclers of the past but 
need to engage in moral judgments. Therefore, should determinism hold true of 
our world, our moral language – and consequently much of our historiographical 
language – would need to undergo serious revision. In this paper we present a 
critical analysis of ‘Historical Inevitability’ (1954), the article in which Berlin argues 
his case, and we point to an important omission which, in our view, weakens the 
author’s thesis.   
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Um Comentário Crítico sobre a Filosofia da 
História de Isaiah Berlin
Resumo: Isaiah Berlin famosamente atacou o que chamou de inevitabilidade 
histórica. Ele acreditava que uma visão causal da história implicaria na adoção de 
uma posição determinística extrema – um tipo de determinismo que excluiria a 
possibilidade do livre-arbítrio, tornando responsabilidade moral em uma noção 
vazia. Sua tese também se baseou no pressuposto de que historiadores não são 
apenas cronistas do passado, mas precisam se empenhar em julgamentos morais. 
Assim, se a tese do determinismo for verdadeira, nossa linguagem moral – e 
consequentemente grande parte de nossa linguagem historiográfica – precisaria 
sofrer séria revisão. Neste trabalho apresentamos uma análise crítica de ‘Historical 
Inevitability’  (1954), artigo no qual Berlin argumenta o seu caso, e apontamos para 
uma importante omissão que, em nossa visão, enfraquece a tese do autor.  
Palavras-chave: Isaiah Berlin. Inevitabilidade histórica. Livre-arbítrio. 
Libertarianismo. Determinismo histórico. História e moralidade.
Initial remarks
Counterfactual history is a contemporary controversial trend in 
historiography which has become popular since the 1990s. It is based on the premise 
that it makes perfect sense to inquire what would have happened had something 
in the past been different, or what would have happened had a certain historical 
figure decided to act differently. Belief in such a premise can be traced back to the 
work of Isaiah Berlin. Although Berlin’s philosophy of history does not engage in 
counterfactuals, it enables them.  
In a nutshell, Berlin’s philosophy of history is an extension of his 
libertarianism: freedom is a requirement for any speculation about alternative 
outcomes in history. History is a description of free human action, in a sense that 
players are not caused to act by impersonal factors. Being free is defined by the principle 
of alternative possibilities, which says that free agents could have acted differently 
than they did, had they so desired. So, no historical events are fully necessitated by 
their antecedents or are to be subsumed under laws of any kind. Hence historical 
explanations would never conform to the covering-law model. Historians also 
morally assess the actions of the agents they study. Such moralising is not to be 
condemned because it plays into the intelligibility of historical explanations. 
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In the coming pages, we will present and object to some ideas put forward 
by Berlin in his famous essay ‘Historical Inevitability’ (2002 [1954]). In this, he 
attacks deterministic views of history, and defends that free human agency is always 
the primary responsible for historical transformation. His arguments assume 
that determinism cannot be reconciled with free will, and with our intuitions and 
talk about morality. According to Berlin this is reason enough for us to abandon 
explanations in which agents are portrayed as unfree, acting according to irresistible 
external (natural or supernatural) forces. Historical events, he says, are not inevitable. 
Historical inevitability
Isaiah Berlin advances the view that deterministic theories or approaches to 
history are committed to some sort of historical inevitability, and consequently with 
the denial of the possibility of free human agency. He claims that historians morally 
assess the actions of historical actors, and such a task would only make sense if 
these actors were free to act in first place. For Berlin, any deterministic explanation 
of human behaviour, past or present, threatens free-will. 
Berlin’s starting point is rather controversial. It says that if historical 
determinism is true, there can be no free human agency: determinism precludes 
that things can happen differently. As humans cannot really choose how to act, 
they become puppets of external, impersonal, irresistible forces, laws of historical 
development. Moral judgments become meaningless – in order to blame or praise 
we presuppose an agent to be able to freely choose from a range of possibilities. 
Berlin does distinguish between substantive deterministic theories of history and 
the scientific varieties,2 but uses the same argument to criticize both, which is 
objectionable.3  
“Historical Inevitability” is still a common reference in the field of 
counterfactual history because it highlights another even more obscure notion: 
the accidental view of history – as opposed to the view that events are causally 
necessitated or inevitable.4 An historical change attributed as the result of an agent’s 
2. A good example, even though Berlin does not explicitly point to it, would be the covering 
laws-model applied to history, as proposed by Carl Hempel in “The Function of General-Laws 
in History” (1942).
3. Christopher Dawson asks: “how is it possible to condemn in one breath the idealist view that 
history is the self-manifestation of the absolute spirit in time and the behaviourist view that history 
is meaningless and that human societies should be studied in the same way we study the termites? 
No doubt both views are open to objection, but not for the same reasons” (1957, 585).  
4. Niall Ferguson claims that not all ‘what if questions’ are relevant, only plausible ones, and 
attributes the very notion of plausibility to Berlin: “This need for plausibility in the formulation of 
counterfactual questions was first pointed out by Sir Isaiah Berlin” (1997, 83).
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decision or action is portrayed as accidental; the agent could have decided differently 
irrespective of the previous conditions to his action. Actions are not law governed.  
Berlin wants to refute historical inevitability, and in order to so he brings 
together different and difficult philosophical problems: the role of impersonal 
forces in history, the problem of free will, history and morality, the ability to make 
historical predictions, the non-scientific status of history, individualism and holism, 
among other things. Critics are right to point out that historical inevitability is an 
overblown idea, as a lot is being packed into it. 
Kinds of historical determinism
(a) The metaphysical approach
Teleological theories of history maintain that to explain an event is solely 
to reveal its purpose, to show that according to a general plan, or cosmological 
order, things happen as they must. This is highly anti-empirical and speculative. 
Under this concept, it is just not possible to consider that some events occur without 
purpose, not fitting into some pattern: this possibility is rejected a priori. But such a 
rejection, Berlin argues, is not warranted. Why should we think of historical events 
fitting into patterns?     
For defendants of this sort of historical determinism, it is the so-called 
rhythm of history that determinates the occurrence of events, consolidating an idea 
of inevitability. Expressions such as ‘the fall and rise’ of an empire are reflections of 
the idea that history is a book where heroes fight against villains, where characters 
are to be qualified as winners or losers, where historical players act as they must, 
guided by forces external to them. To explain is to identify the grand patterns of 
history. 
A history of winners and losers fighting battles that have already been 
decided for them by some impersonal force or entity is incompatible with free will, 
which in turn is bounded with moral responsibility. If determinism of this kind were 
true, individual responsibility would be an illusion. Even if agents were conscious 
of their ‘enslavement’, free will could not be restored. 
(b) History as the understanding of a transcendent reality
A second form of determinism in history defends that an explanation is not based 
on the identification of goals, but on the understanding of a transcendent reality, something 
that lies above, or outside, human beings, an inevitable and self‐explaining harmony where:
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Each element of it is necessitated to be what it is by its relations to the other elements 
and to the whole… if we do not see actual events and persons as connected with 
each other by those relations of logical necessity which would make it inconceivable 
that anything could be other than it is, that is due solely to the failure of our own 
vision… We are blinded by ignorance, stupidity, passion, and the task of explanation 
in science or in history is the attempt to show the chaos of appearances as an 
imperfect reflection of the perfect order of reality. Explanation is the discovery of 
the ‘underlying’ pattern (Berlin, 2002, 107-108). 
Such an account of historical determinism preaches that players do not 
seek self-realisation but act according to the workings of an ultimate and timeless 
structure of reality – one that provides the cause, the explanation and the justification 
for all that is. It cannot be understood simple by the senses, as these provide only a 
view of the world of appearances, but by understanding the pattern that governs the 
universe. To understand the dual relation between reality and appearance explains 
and justifies. 
 (c) History emulating the physical sciences
This approach, Berlin maintains, is paradoxical: “scientific method is surely 
the very negation of metaphysical speculation. But historically the one is closely 
interwoven with the other, [as both maintain] that all that exists is necessarily an 
object in material nature, and therefore susceptible to explanation by scientific laws” 
(Berlin, 2002, 108).
Inspired by the success of physics in classifying, correlating, predicting, 
it seemed reasonable, at some point, to imagine that also our psychological lives, 
social relationships and activities should be explained by appeal to general laws. 
If successful, the enterprise would bring unity to all sciences. Defendants of this 
approach look for support from the idea that, in principle, there is no reason to object 
the possibility of laws of historical development, or psychological laws capable of 
providing true and complete explanation of human actions. Such laws would also, 
perhaps, establish a symmetry between explanation and prediction.
It is understandable that also historians would want to apply scientific 
methods to historical studies. But doing so would have moral, political and even 
religious implications: we describe human behaviour appealing to elements like 
character, motives, intentions, which can hardly be captured by such methods. To 
omit or to lessen the importance of these personal factors would be artificial: we use 
these to evaluate “not merely the degree and kind of influence of this or that motive 
or character upon what happens, but also its moral or political quality in terms 
of whatever scale of values one consciously or semi-consciously accepts in one’s 
thought or action” (Berlin, 2002, 97).
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Not only the scientific method would not account for evaluating political 
and moral qualities, but the very existence of patterns and regularities in history 
is an object of great controversy. Berlin denies the existence of laws of historical 
development because any attempt to explain human behaviour as the result of 
necessitating causes and in accordance with deterministic laws would imply, he 
thinks, in the denial of freedom and moral responsibility. 
Consequences of historical inevitability
Metaphysical and scientific models of historical determinism share the view 
that to explain is to subsume the subject matter to laws or general formulae. The 
assumption is that if we knew all the laws, and all the relevant factors, then it would 
be possible to satisfactorily explain why things happen as they do, precluding that 
things could have happened otherwise.5 An event’s description becomes henceforth 
a mere reflex of historical inevitability. 
As to the question ‘Why in history things happen as they do?’ deterministic 
positions attribute different meanings for it: “for teleologists [it] means ‘In pursuit 
of what unalterable goal?’; for the non-teleological metaphysical ‘realists’ it means 
‘Determined unalterably by what ultimate pattern?’; and for the upholders of the 
Comtean ideals (…) it means ‘Resulting from what causes?’” (Berlin, 2002, 109-110).
Berlin’s central point, which he repeatedly states, is that teleological, 
metaphysical or scientific determinism, if proven true, would be incompatible 
with agents’ free will and to our common understanding of what free will entails. 
Freedom of choice would be just an illusion. The question ‘What would have 
happened otherwise?’ would become absurd: all things evolve as they must, and 
we only come to entertain such thoughts compelled by ignorance of the facts and 
the laws. Another consequence of determinism, according to Berlin, is that moral 
assessments, i.e., to say that a certain agent should have acted differently, would 
also become nonsensical.
Berlin’s attack on determinism rests on practical elements. We do morally 
assess people’s behaviour. We also praise agents for, say, their courage, for without 
their actions, things would have been worse, and so on. And the reason for doing 
so, according to Berlin, is that people normally believe (or talk as if) individuals 
are truly free to decide and act. For Berlin, such a belief is supported by another: 
that when it comes to decision making, humans are not determined by laws. If this 
premise is false, if human lives are ultimately law-governed, then we only praise 
and blame to the degree to which we do not know the laws that command human 
lives. “The more we know (…) the farther the area of human freedom is narrowed. 
5. Unless the laws or the initial conditions were different
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For the omniscient being, who sees why nothing can be otherwise than as it is, the 
notions of responsibility or guilt, of right and wrong, are necessarily empty” (Berlin, 
2002, 110).
 Believers in the deterministic assumption drew different projections 
for societal evolution. Some have an optimistic outlook, saying that it is just a matter 
of time until progress and education help us get over many social problems, giving 
rise to a more mature and peaceful society. Berlin cites Jules Verne, H. G. Wells, 
Anatole France and Bernard Shaw as good examples of this view. Others adopt the 
view that progress is to be achieved, but not without struggle and sacrifice. Hegel 
and Marx think of humans as part of a wider range of law-governed entities, either 
material (Marx) or spiritual (Hegel) in form. When irresistible and impersonal 
laws, independent of their nature, reach a certain point of evolution, a new era for 
mankind is ‘due’, and wise are those who can see in which direction the world is 
evolving. Those who realise that human life is governed by larger ‘wholes’ of forces 
we are all subjected to, finally get to understand the flux of history. For proponents 
of substantive philosophies of history, the independent and directed evolution of 
each of these wholes should be the subject matter of historiography. 
According to the deterministic outlook, as broadly defined by Berlin, when 
historians undertake the task of explaining an agent’s action, they must first try 
to understand the structures and strictures that help shape and determine this 
individual’s life. It is of ultimate importance to grasp the state of development of 
any of these ‘wholes’, or structures, or forces, in order to deduce from them why 
the agent thinks or feels in one way rather than another. Berlin highlights that the 
identities of these wholes or forces vary among authors, so he compiles a brief list. 
These can be: “race, colour, Church, nation, class, climate, irrigation, technology, 
geopolitical situation, civilisation, social structure, the Human Spirit, the Collective 
Unconscious...” (Berlin, 2002, 114). These are the determining factors for all else that 
happens in the human sphere. Most individuals remain unaware of the influence of 
such factors, but the few who understand the illusion of free agency shall become 
the natural leaders. But if even leaders are no more than puppets of extraneous 
all-encompassing determining processes, then individual responsibility becomes 
an empty notion – or so claims Berlin. If the history of the world is governed 
by impersonal laws, then all explanations must be given in terms of these laws. 
Consequently, the tendency is to say that laws are responsible for the world’s state 
of affairs, and not individuals. There can be no blame or praise.  
One should be reminded that Berlin is not denying that determinism may 
be a property truthfully ascribed to some systems in the natural world. As he says, 
no one should get accused or blamed for not being taller, or for having certain hair 
colour, or for carrying (or lacking) intellectual prowess. These traits originate from 
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processes oblivious to anyone’s will, and perhaps obtain out of natural necessity. 
Berlin seems to be adopting a dualist position, stating that the realm of the mind 
operates independently of the realm of physical things, in the sense that our actions 
are not necessitated by any physical processes. It they were, then we would have 
to radically change our understanding of responsibility and freedom. Here lies the 
locus of Berlin’s attack on historical inevitability. 
Berlin believes that any physicalist explanation of human behaviour would 
be incompatible with the way we think of ourselves as free agents. We judge other 
people based on the assumption that they are free in the same way we perceive 
ourselves to be. Berlin does not deny that necessity may obtain in the physical 
world, but when it comes to human intentions, the view that everything that 
‘is’ is ‘necessary and inevitable’ leads to the unacceptable conclusion that moral 
judgements are absurd. If the physicalist theory is true, one could never justify 
blame or applaud:  “Alexander, Caesar, Attila, Muhammad, Cromwell, Hitler are 
like floods and earthquakes, sunsets, oceans, mountains; we may admire or fear 
them, welcome or curse them, but to denounce or extol their acts is as sensible as 
addressing sermons to a tree” (Berlin, 2002, 115-116). An agent’s behaviour ought 
to be explained solely in terms of the relevant determining factors (race, class, 
economy…); to condemn their actions would be to ascribe them decision powers 
– as if they could have acted differently. But historical determinism says this is an 
illusion, and that history is reducible to natural science or metaphysics.  
Berlin’s criticism of deterministic outlooks on history take the form of a 
reductio ad absurdum. Defendants of historical determinism maintain that it is 
important for historians to refrain from anachronic or transcultural judgments, 
not reading the values of the present into past eras. It would be absurd, even for 
the determinist, to condemn ancient civilisations for not being similar to, say, 
the American civilisation. In order to do so, it is important to exercise ‘powers of 
sympathy’, i.e., to mentally transport ourselves, to the best of our capacities, to 
cultures and times very distant from ours. When explaining the actions of a historical 
figure, historians must sympathetically consider the structures and strictures 
shaping their subject’s actions that existed at the time. And the reason for doing, 
according to Berlin, is the widely held belief that historical agents’ actions need to 
be assessed ‘justly’. 
Nevertheless, if historical determinism is to be understood as the doctrine 
of historical inevitability, then every qualifying sentence describing past deeds 
cannot be just or unjust, but only true or false. And why should historians seek 
to be just? The mere fact that we praise historical explanations that treat historical 
figures ‘fairly’ implies belief in individual responsibility. The degree of individual 
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responsibility one is willing to concede depends on one’s view of history, but it is 
never nothing: 
And yet it is this … that is virtually denied by those … steeped in metaphysical 
or scientific determinism. Such thinkers seem to me committed to the belief that 
although we may not be able to plot the exact curve of each individual life with the 
data at our disposal and the laws we claim to have discovered, yet, in principle, if we 
were omniscient, we could do so, at any rate in the case of others, as precisely as the 
techniques of scientific prediction will allow” (Berlin, 2002, 119).
The role of impersonal forces.
By attacking historical inevitability Berlin intended to defend the view that 
human choices must be understood as ultimately free from impersonal forces, and 
that it is legitimate to think that things might happen otherwise: an agent can decide 
differently, irrespectively of the state of the world, as the human mind is unlikely to 
be governed by deterministic laws. 
But what are vast impersonal forces? In an example taken from literature, 
Aldous Huxley points out impersonal factors he thinks are threatening to human 
freedom, such as the mounting pressure of population growth pressing upon 
existing resources. In the developing world such a pressure results in a decrease of 
living standards, and an increase of poverty and hunger. As the economic position of 
poorer countries becomes more precarious, governments must act more decisively 
to prevent social unrest, sometimes pushing towards totalitarianism. In his preface 
to Brave New World, Huxley says: 
Impersonal forces over which we have almost no control seem to be pushing us all 
in the direction of the Brave New Worldian nightmare; and this impersonal pushing 
is being consciously accelerated by representatives of commercial and political 
organizations who have developed a number of new techniques for manipulating, 
in the interest of some minority, the thoughts and feelings of the masses” (Huxley, 
2000 [1958], 8). 
An impersonal force can be a demographic or economic factor over which 
one has no or little control, an aspect which will determine how one is going to 
live, constraining possibilities for rational action. The presence of such impersonal 
factors can be overwhelming. One can often feel powerless when facing economic, 
political or social pressures, and it would be reasonable to assume that one’s desires 
and reasons for acting are influenced by such mechanisms. Berlin is not oblivious 
to this. What Berlin wishes to maintain, however, is that historians should not 
overemphasise the importance of such impersonal forces while underrating the 
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importance of human responsibility. They must strike the right balance between 
describing action as a rational response to external factors, while not falling into the 
inevitability trap. 
When trying to explain certain episodes of human history, historians 
may choose between personal and impersonal theories of history. The former is 
characterised by doctrines where exceptional individuals, guided by free will, lead 
mankind through important changes. The latter is characterised by individuals 
whose collective desires – which are not determined by impersonal forces – are 
responsible for historical developments. It is the historian’s job, Berlin maintains, to 
investigate this complex chain of human desires, motives, fears, intentions, and ask 
“who wanted what, and when, and where, in what way; how many men avoided 
or pursued this or that goal (…); and, further, to ask under what circumstances 
such wants or fears have proved effective, and to what extent, and with what 
consequences” (Berlin, 2002, 98).
Impersonal theories of history, however, understand that overemphasizing 
intentions, fears, desires, beliefs, is a mistake; moral responsibility falls under the 
weight of human powerlessness. The impersonal theorist could advocate there is 
little one could do to avoid, for example, scarcity of resources in face of population 
growth, or the effect of prolonged draughts on the availability of food, provided 
any identifiable pattern is true. According to this view an agent’s behaviour is 
at least partially determined by causes beyond his control – physical factors, the 
environment, customs, race, nation, class, species, or even some obscure non-
empirical entity such as Hegel’s Weltgeist.6 
Berlin’s take on the role of impersonal forces is objectionable. No argument 
is presented as to why impersonal forces should never be emphasised. It could be 
argued, perhaps, that part of the disagreement lies on the notion of force, which can be 
misleading. In fact, there is no historical force in the sense of an external entity/agent 
which manipulates a subject’s behaviour. Even if sometimes we say so, individuals 
are not causally manipulated by society, governments, or demographics. One could 
talk of, say, social pressures which count as a cause for an agent’s response, but 
ultimately, we say that it was the agent’s decision to react in a certain way. 
If we adopt Lewis theory of causation, for instance, we can say that a 
complex economic event (an impersonal “force”), such as the economic crisis of 1929, 
caused the suicide of a few bankers and speculators. Had the crisis not existed, the 
6. [World Spirit]. Andy Blunden identifies two different meanings for this term: “in Hegel’s earliest 
works, ‘spirit’ meant the character of a people or a times, which is formed by their experiences in 
history, producing and reproducing their lives, enjoying victories and suffering defeats in war. Later 
on, after about 1804/5, it was a ‘World Spirit’ which expressed or manifested itself in the life and times 
of civilisation as a whole. Rather than an outcome of history, it was present at the outset only needing 
to unfold and become conscious of itself” (Blunden, 2007).
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suicides would (probably) not have occurred. The crisis as such fits the category of 
an external factor over which the individual has little power. One can, and we often 
do, say that the pressure was overwhelming, and at some point, suicide seemed the 
only way out, so that the agent decided for it. 
The overrating of impersonal forces is, according to Berlin, threatening 
to how we think of freedom and moral responsibility, and it also underestimates 
individuals’ causal powers. The basic idea is to say that despite structural constrains, 
an agent is never determined to act in a uniquely possible way. It is this leeway for 
action which makes the agent free. For Berlin, it is always the case that historical 
figures could have acted otherwise: no action is externally necessitated because its 
fundamental cause is the will. The determinist, according to Berlin, characterises 
historical agents as victims, depriving them of personal causal powers, and denying 
that an act of will can make a meaningful difference. Historical explanation 
should therefore subscribe to the libertarian view, or risk turning moral categories 
meaningless.   
In a libertarian sense, the suicides of speculators in the wake of the US 
stock exchange crash of 1929 are free acts of will. For the determinist, it is an 
example of how overwhelming and irresistible external factors may be. But a good 
historical explanation of such events can never do away with any of the relevant 
factors, neither personal nor impersonal. The motivations for the suicides go back 
to agents’ decisions to enter a risky trade, or to speculate. Such a decision is not 
entirely free, but constrained by organic, psychological factors, like a willingness 
to ignore risk and a pressing expectation of great reward. A risk averse personality 
would be a strong deterrent. The deeply negative outcome of the trade comes down 
to economic impersonal factors like oversupply, and collective, social factors such 
as herd behaviour and panic selling. Which of these factors is to be emphasised 
should be determined, we believe, by the nature and scope of the Why? question 
the historian is trying to answer. If asked why some speculators committed suicide, 
social and economic factors will gain the spotlight. If asked why New York banker 
J. J. Riordan shot himself in late 1929, one must delve into his personal traits, and 
the decisions he made prior to his last, which may help explain it. The first question 
raises the issue of inevitability. Could the crash have been prevented, or was it 
necessary? Even if one says it seemed inevitable, it hardly poses any threat to moral 
responsibility or freedom. In contrast, one would struggle to justify the inevitability 
thesis ascribed to Riordan’s suicide. 
In fact, inevitability is often used in a charitable way. Marxist historian E. 
H. Carr says that historians do not think of events as inevitable before they occur: 
“nothing in history is inevitable, except in the formal sense that, for it to have 
happened otherwise, the antecedent causes would have had to be different. (…) I 
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am perfectly prepared to do without ‘inevitable,’ ‘unavoidable,’ ‘inescapable,’ and 
even ‘ineluctable’” (Carr, 1964, 96). Personal and impersonal factors are in constant 
relation one with the other, and complex causal chains are often made of innumerous 
events, some personal, others impersonal. It would be pointless trying to decide, a 
priori, which theory of history historians should prioritise, as it very much depends 
on the nature of the explanandum. It is not so much that Marxist historians deprive 
individual historical agents of causal powers, or minimise their moral responsibility. 
But the set of Why? questions they attempt to answer focus on economic factors and 
collective behaviour over the long run, so their model of explanation – deterministic 
in the eyes of Berlin – may not suit the needs of biographers or micro-historians, 
which are often motivated by different sets of questions and different timeframes.   
Furthermore, there is another objection to Berlin. Marx and Hegel are 
presented in ‘Historical Inevitability’ as proponents of historical necessity. But the 
notion of necessity advocated by these thinkers is not one that renders free will an 
illusion, or one that sustains the view that all events happen as they must, according 
to irresistible forces. In fact, Hegel never claimed that a philosophical grasp of the 
necessities of history would allow historians to make predictions about its future 
course. As William Dray points out in his own Philosophy of History: “Hegel does not 
really attempt to show that each [event] follows inevitably from what preceded it 
in the main line of historical development” (Dray, 1964, 74). Even his description of 
Ancient Greek history does not portray an aura of determinism: “the interest of the 
world’s history hung trembling in the balance” (Hegel, 1956, 257) – a quote which 
suggests that the outcome of the battle was open, or undecided at that point, or 
not necessitated by the circumstances. Hegel’s account of the lives of great leaders, 
the heroes of history (Alexander, Caesar, or Napoleon) is also one that does not 
undertake an “impersonal” approach to history. In some moments, it seems to be 
rather the opposite. Dray identifies in Hegel’s account of the role of these great 
men an aspect of historical contingency which he defines as “the fortunate timely 
availability of both men and conditions”, and adds that “[Hegel] envisaged their 
unpredictable interventions as making a real difference to the course of history” 
(Dray, 1964, 74). 
But Hegel did believe that some historical events are necessitated, or 
‘postulated by the circumstances’: 
Caesar rise to power was, according to Hegel, an event postulated by the 
circumstances: “the Republic could no longer exist in Rome. We see, especially 
from Cicero’s writings, own all public affairs were decided by the private authority 
of the more eminent citizens – by their power, their wealth; and what tumultuary 
proceedings marked all political transactions. In the Republic, therefore, there was 
no longer any security; that could be looked for in a single will (…) Caesar, judged 
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by the great scope of history, did the Right; since he furnished a mediated element, 
and that kind of political bond which men’s condition required (Hegel, 1956, 312).
In the quote, the only event that is necessitated, or postulated by the 
circumstances, is the fall of the republic: “conditions being what they were, the 
republic would necessarily fall.” But we can also ask: “Would the state be saved? Only 
if there was a Caesar to do what was required – and if he would do it.” So, the event 
of which Caesar has become the irreplaceable protagonist – the fall of the Republic – 
was necessary, but it was free human agency that accounts for how it occurred. Dray 
concludes that “what was required [of Caesar] was, of course, necessary; but only 
in the sense of being necessary for the salvation of the state – and for the continued 
development of history in the development of increasing freedom” (Dray, 1964, 75). 
Hegel also recognises that there are periods of history when previous gains in terms 
of societal development are entirely lost.  
Hegel’s metaphysical speculation – the belief that history has a goal, or a 
rationality, which is achieved by means of a certain Will – is not a thesis we must 
examine any further. However, if the previous interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy 
of history with regards to historical necessity is correct, then such necessity is not 
deterministic in the sense feared by Berlin. Hegel is not simply placing historical 
agents as powerless victims who causally succumb to the pressure of impersonal 
forces. Hegelianism does not entail the denial of free will, but only that some kinds 
of events, such as a government being overthrown, may be necessitated by the 
circumstances. Such a thesis may be false, but it shows that one of Berlin’s worries 
is unwarranted. 
 The presupposition of incompatibilism 
Berlin’s attack on historical inevitability is motivated by his belief in 
incompatibilism between determinism and freedom. For the incompatibilist, a 
universe governed by all-encompassing deterministic laws rules out the possibility 
of free will. Determinism must be false, or our moral categories would become 
illusory. 
We can define determinism along these lines: for the world to be deterministic 
there must be a set of deterministic laws L which makes the world deterministic. 
Now, given L and the state of the world at time t0, there is a uniquely possible future 
state of the world at t1. Determinism entails that it is physically impossible, given 
the laws and the previous state of the world, for the state of the world at t1 or at 
any future time tn to be different than it is – the state of the word at t1 is determined 
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by the laws and the state of the world at t0, or any prior time.7 Another possible 
characterisation for determinism, which includes causation, would say that every 
event has a cause or causes, and such causes necessitate their effects. So if a causes 
e, then the occurrence of a necessitates the occurrence of e, where e is the uniquely 
possible consequent of a. There are other possible definitions of determinism, but 
for the moment, let’s bear in mind these simple characterisations. 
The classic incompatibilist position, such as Berlin’s, depends on a certain 
understanding of freedom: an agent has acted freely if it was the case that he could 
have done otherwise. If determinism is true and the history of the universe is 
determined by its prior states, according to L, then it is not the case that historical 
players could have done otherwise, so agents are unfree, and counterfactual 
speculations are pointless. A common argument in favour of incompatibilism is the 
‘consequent argument’. McKenna provides a non-technical sketch of it:
No one has power over the facts of the past and the laws of nature. 
No one has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail 
every fact of the future (i.e., determinism is true). 
__________
Therefore, no one has power over the facts of the future (McKenna, 2009).
The consequent argument entails that if determinism is a true theory, an agent 
cannot alter any fact about the future, even his/her own future. Therefore, freedom 
and moral responsibility become void of meaning. But we have a strong intuition 
that we are free, this seems to be presupposed by the way we use our language, by 
our moral codes, legal system, and many other institutions. Furthermore, there are 
physical theories that suggest that some systems do not behave deterministically. In 
the absence of any compelling argument for universal determinism, and considering 
our desire to keep our moral categories meaningful, the libertarian concludes that 
there should be no reason for us to abandon our commitment to freedom.  
Consider the proposition ‘Brutus stabbed Caesar to death’. If determinism 
is false, says the libertarian, then Brutus was free to act, and is morally responsible 
for his action precisely because he could have refrained from stabbing Caesar. If 
determinism is true, however, Brutus could not have refrained from doing it – since 
the history of the world is uniquely determined by the laws – therefore Brutus 
was not free to act, and can’t be morally blamed for doing what he did. So, moral 
responsibility is a consequence of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: an agent 
is morally responsible for his/her actions only if it is true that s/he could have done 
otherwise – or so the incompatibilist claims. 
7. McKenna offers a similar characterisation. He defines determinism as the metaphysical thesis 
that the facts of the past, in conjunction with the laws of nature, entail every truth about the future … if 
determinism is true, then, given the actual past, and holding fixed the laws of nature, only one future 
is possible at any moment in time (2009). 
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Libertarians are incompatibilists who say an agent is free iff s/he can do 
otherwise. Still, the libertarian needs to find a way of explaining a player’s action 
without appealing to causes. Libertarians sometimes appeal to two strategies, as we 
shall now discuss. 
The first strategy involves some sort of dualism. Libertarians say that the 
mental states that explain Brutus decision to stab Caesar are non-physical. So, even 
if determinism holds for the physical world, mental states fall outside. Libertarians 
then claim that human actions are not caused, but are to be explained by the 
ascription of reasons, where reasons are not causes. 
There is something odd about claiming that reasons and causes belong to 
different logical categories. If Brutus had the desire to stab Caesar, and the belief 
that this was the best action for him to do, why should we not say that his belief and 
desire caused him to act the way he did? Mental states are non-physical, but the 
stabbing of Caesar involves a physical, bodily movement. If universal determinism 
holds, then Brutus’ arm could not have refrained from stabbing Caesar, even if 
Brutus’ mental states are not captured under the same deterministic physical laws 
that govern whatever his arm does. 
As Brian Garrett concisely points out: 
…most human actions […] involve bodily movements. So any deterministic 
constraints on bodily movement will equally be constraints on human action. Thus, 
neither the ‘mental states are non-physical’ nor the reasons are not causes’ lines yield 
any convincing response to the argument for incompatibilism (Garrett, 2006, 113).
Another strategy often used by libertarians is to say that there is good 
evidence from quantum mechanics that the thesis of universal determinism is false, 
that some systems behave probabilistically, and that objective chance is real – so there 
can be free will. Such a strategy is flawed. Elliott Sober provides a witty example as 
to why indeterminism does not help the libertarian: “suppose (…) your beliefs and 
desires determine what you will do. I now offer you a brain implant, whereby a tiny 
roulette wheel is introduced into your deliberation process (…) would the operation 
make you free? It seems implausible” (Sober, 2001, 304). Instead of being enslaved 
only by beliefs and desires, now humans are enslaved by “beliefs, desires and a 
roulette wheel” (Ibidem). The roulette wheel does provide objective chance, and the 
possibility that historical events might evolve along different trajectories, but it does 
not help the libertarian’s case.  
A suitable response to Berlin would be to endorse some version of 
compatibilism, rejecting the consequent argument. This is an alternative Berlin does 
not even consider in ‘Historical Inevitability’. The compatibilist attempts to explain 
why agents act as they do, and at the same time argues that such actions can be 
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both free and determined. The starting point for the compatibilist is not to think of 
freedom as depending on the truth of the ‘could have done otherwise’ principle. 
Instead, freedom is often characterised as being functionally capable of acting in 
accordance to one’s own beliefs and desires. The task is not only to account for 
the possibility of free-will in a deterministic universe, but to portray free will as a 
theory that requires us to accept that every event – and action – has been caused in 
some way.  
Harry Frankfurt, in “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility” (1969), 
famously attacked the libertarian characterisation of freedom. He offered an example of a 
case in which the agent could not have done otherwise, but we still want to say, intuitively, 
that s/he was morally responsible for the action. 
Michael McKenna reconstructs Frankfurt’s argument along the following 
lines: 
Jones has resolved to shoot Smith. Black has learned of Jones’s plan and wants Jones 
to shoot Smith. But Black would prefer that Jones shoot Smith on his own. However, 
concerned that Jones might waver in his resolve to shoot Smith, Black secretly 
arranges things so that, if Jones should show any sign at all that he will not shoot 
Smith, Black will be able to manipulate Jones in such a way that Jones will shoot 
Smith. As things transpire, Jones follows through with his plans and shoots Smith 
for his own reasons. No one else in any way threatened or coerced Jones, offered 
Jones a bribe, or even suggested that he shoot Smith. Jones shot Smith under his own 
steam. Black never intervened (McKenna, 2009). 
Jones is not free to do otherwise: he will inevitably shoot Jones. However, 
we say that Jones is morally responsible for the shooting because he willingly 
shoots Smith. If freedom is associated with moral responsibility, we clearly need a 
definition of freedom different from the one generated by the principle of alternative 
possibilities, we need a definition of freedom associated to the idea that an agent is 
free if s/he acts according to his/her will. If an agent suffers from a mental illness 
which affects the way his/her mind works, then the agent is unfree because the 
actions are not being caused by his/her will in a proper way, but by ‘something 
foreign’.   
 In the case of historiography, the something foreign could be any of 
the impersonal factors we have mentioned before. The free-willed agent is in control 
when his/her actions accord with his/her will. Even if it is true that physically s/he 
cannot do otherwise, s/he can still be free. In short, not all actions are free, but there 
can be free action. Moral responsibility is not about being physically capable of 
doing otherwise, but whether one wants to have the motivation to act in one way 
or another. Furthermore, when free will issues an action, the desire that issues it 
is a cause of the act the agent performs – it determines what is to come – and his/
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her wanting that action-issuing will is what makes him/her morally responsible for 
it. The conclusion is that the free-willed agent is morally responsible irrespective 
of determinism being true. And depending on how the causal relation between 
the desire and the action is characterised, it could even be said that the free-willed 
action not only is compatible with, but requires determinism to be true. The so-called 
deterministic approaches to history would considerably strengthen their position 
by thinking of freedom along these lines. Blame and praise of historical figures, 
even under a deterministic outlook, would still be meaningful. 
History and morality
The relation between history and morality is another thesis endorsed by 
Berlin. In order to argue that historians should not refrain from moralising, Berlin 
attacks the opposite thesis: the anti-moralist theory. The latter represents how the 
historical determinist conceives of human history: a place where all is set to occur 
in a certain way, where players have no free-will, and all there is to do is to identify 
the right patterns of historical development. However, if ‘things are what they are’, 
predetermined by laws and the earlier states of the world, then such a belief can 
only lead to deception. To avoid being deceived we have two options: (1) to accept 
the existence of impersonal forces guiding mankind towards its end, assuming the 
role of participants in the self-realisation of that force or mystical power; (2) to admit 
that all events occur in discoverable patterns or system of laws. 
Now, (1) Seem to be an unpalatable choice for many; (2) focus on the 
identification of laws of historical development. Both positions represent a version 
of historical inevitability because historical players are represented as unfree 
(according to the principle of alternative possibilities). Berlin’s conclusion is that 
the antimoralist’s commitment to any of these theses necessitates the acceptance 
that all good and bad things are pre-determined or conditioned by general laws. 
Our attitudes are then regarded as rational according to the degree to which we 
understand our place in this ‘world plan’. As different societies perceive themselves 
differently, it is not possible for us to blame or praise them for acting as they did, as 
there can be no static references for morally evaluating people. Every event, action 
or thought., according to this view, is “caused to occur as it does by the machinery 
of history itself – by the impersonal forces of class, race, culture, history, Reason … 
This organisation of our lives, which we did not create, cannot alter it, … is ultimately 
responsible for everything” (Berlin, 2002, 103). Therefore, the sole conclusion to 
be reached is that humans are not free to choose as they cannot evade natural or 
supernatural determination, “for if such choices were real, the determined world 
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structure which alone makes complete explanation [scientific or metaphysical] 
possible could not exist.” (Ibidem).
 Berlin’s attack on anti-moralist history is based on the discussion of 
the possibility of objective moral judgments as opposed to the fallacious theory that 
everything is relative. When historians try to avoid moral judgements in the name 
of historical objectivity, he says, they tend to overemphasise impersonal factors. 
Berlin asserts that such an attitude induces “humility by forcing us to admit that 
our own outlook and scales of value are neither permanent nor universally accepted 
(…) such a line of approach throws doubt upon all attempts to establish a definitive 
boundary between the individual’s free choice and his natural … necessitation.” 
(Berlin, 2002, 126)
One possible response to the view that determinism is incompatible with free 
will is to stop making moral judgements. Scepticism about moral assessments come 
from two different perceptions, those who think we know too much (deterministic 
position) and those who think we know too little (relativistic position), and are in 
fact conditioned by our own historical environment. With this distinction in mind 
Berlin suggests that both perceptions do not offer good advice for historians. 
…some feel sure that the natural sciences will in the end account for everything, 
explain our behaviour in terms of natural causes. Others (…) explain it by speaking 
of invisible powers and dominions, nations, races, cultures. Others speak in terms 
of some teleological procession, or hierarchy, whereby all individuals, countries, 
institutions, cultures, ages, fulfil their several parts in some cosmic drama. To 
know all is to understand all; it is to know why things are and must be as they are; 
therefore the more we know the more absurd we must think those who suppose that 
things could have been otherwise, and so fall into the irrational temptation to praise 
or blame. Tout comprendre, c’est tout pardonner is transformed into a mere truism. 
(Berlin, 2002, 127)
By representing ourselves as victims of such laws and forces it becomes 
easy to explain away our failures, what might strengthen the idea that all things 
happen inevitably; all choices are caused by elements or forces we do not control. To 
understand reality equals seeing that nothing could be different than it is.8 It follows 
that the better we understand these laws or trends the more forgiving we can be 
to others and to our own acts. We escape moral dilemmas by portraying them as 
unreal. 
Berlin accepts that deterministic theories do a good job at explaining 
physical phenomena, as some systems do appear to behave deterministically. Think 
of billiard balls moving on a pool table; an adequate explanation of their movement 
8. Berlin exemplifies this view by citing Spinoza, Godwin, Tolstoy, Comte, mystics and rationalists, 
theologians and scientific materialists, metaphysicians and dogmatic empiricists, American 
sociologists, Russian Marxists and German historicists. 
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will invariably appeal to Newtonian laws of motion. But such an approach would 
not be applicable to history, he says, because human players are presumably free 
from whatever laws govern the physical world. 
This position implies that there are two types of events: 
(1) natural events which are not the result of free action, i.e., no agent 
contributed to it and therefore it is not up to any agent whether the event occurs or 
not; 
(2) actions that are the result of free human agency. 
Berlin believes that type-1 events do not causally determine type-2 events, 
so our response to what happens in the world remains free – a position typically 
adopted by incompatibilists. As our actions are the result of indeterminism, we can 
have moral responsibility. Berlin now turns to how far historical understanding is 
possible, and what this tells us in terms of being in a position of ‘knowing all’.  The 
argument follows these lines:
a. Even dispassionate historians find it difficult to sympathetically place 
themselves in the historical agent’s shoes, because it is impossible to know all factors 
associated with the agent’s behaviour;
b. Consequently, historian’s evaluations (also moral evaluations) are 
founded on incomplete or insufficient data;
c. Therefore, historian’s ignorance outweighs knowledge, and all we can 
hope for is to shed a little light on some ‘corner’ of the past.
As Berlin proceeds, he says that the previous argument is the origin of two 
distinct theses about human morality:
(T1) The thesis of human ineffectiveness 
Men are capable of deliberating and taking decisions, but such events do 
not impact greatly on the actual course of events. As humans are powerless, motives 
should not be part of the historian’s worries, as his/her real business “is to discover 
and describe what occurred, and how and why, if he allows his moral opinions 
of men’s characters and motives – those least effective of all historical factors – to 
colour his interpretations, he thereby exaggerates their importance…” (Berlin, 2002, 
136).  
(T2) The thesis of human ignorance 
This thesis relies on the assumption that our knowledge of the world is 
insufficient to justify the ascription of responsibilities. Because we are not omniscient 
beings we should not presumptuously try to do it. Historians should adopt a humbler 
position by accepting their ignorance and inability to ascribe moral responsibility. 
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Berlin concludes that it is possible that T1 and T2 to be both, as they seem to 
originate from the same “pessimistic conviction of human weakness, blindness and 
ineffectiveness both in thought and in action” (Berlin, 2002, 136). As these doctrines 
were proposed with the same objective – to make individual responsibility ‘melt 
away’ – the consequence of their acceptance is that individuals must not be blamed 
or praised because they cannot help but act as they do, or because we know too little 
to judge them.
But because neither T1 nor T2 accord with our ordinary views on morality, 
it is important to find a way to refute them, which Berlin undertakes to do with the 
two following arguments. We will try to reconstruct these from his eloquent but 
somewhat repetitive prose.  
(a) The anti-moralist position is absurd
Ascribing individual responsibility is not possible given our ineffectiveness 
and/or ignorance; which means we should not bring charges of moralism against 
historians who do try to praise or blame historical figures. But all moral standards 
are pronounced relative, so it is not rationally justifiable to attack or defend the 
position of condemning moralism in history. We face a reductio ad absurdum of the 
entire position, as we cannot condemn an attitude towards the biased writing of 
history, as nothing can be condemned or defended. 
(b) anti-moralism is not compatible with how we talk about the world
There is nothing questionable when we say that Pasteur was a benefactor, 
and Hitler’s actions were evil. In saying such things, we are only making public 
our approval and disapproval of people’s actions. With our disapproval of Hitler’s 
actions, we make clear that we are not favourably disposed towards acting as he 
did, and that our moral and intellectual ideals differ greatly from our perception of 
his ideals. It is a common assumption we make that Hitler could and should have 
acted differently than he did. But if universal determinism holds, then we only think 
of people as being capable of acting differently because of our failure to realise that 
they could not have acted differently. Or it could be that our ignorance prevents us 
in telling how different they could have acted. 
However, it seems impossible to eliminate from our ordinary speech all 
value judgements, as it would cause enormous distortions to how we communicate 
in general. To blame historians for adopting a biased position would be equally 
absurd. The call for historians to supress moral insights seems to originate from a 
confusion of the methods of the human studies with those of the natural sciences. 
And because there is no good reason to adopt the anti-moralist approach, and 
because by adopting it we cause serious trouble to our ordinary language, historians 
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should not refrain from making moral judgments – although they should, of course, 
refrain from committing excesses.
There are two possible interpretations of Berlin’s position regarding 
moralising history. We could say that Berlin is only attacking the anti-moralist 
theory, by saying that there is no reason historians should refrain from value-
judgements; and that the anti-moralist position is self-refuting. If historians wish 
to express admiration for Napoleon, they should not be condemned for doing it. 
Analogously, if a historian wishes to remain factually objective, pointing to causes 
without ever moralising, that would also be acceptable. Moral assessment is here 
seen as facultative, not necessary for the provision of adequate causal explanations. 
However, Berlin’s position about morality appears more complex, as it 
overlaps with his rejection of determinism. Another way of interpreting him would 
be to say that the anti-moralist approach to history is only a thing for the historical 
determinist. When the libertarian historically explains by appealing to reasons, 
motives, intentions (which are not causes for the libertarian) s/he necessarily 
assesses the political and moral qualities of all players involved. Berlin’s insistence 
on the necessity of free will is clearly motivated by his assessment that the historian 
needs to morally qualify his/her object of study. Berlin believes that historians’ 
descriptions of an agent’s action reveal whether they praise or blame the agent for 
acting as s/he did, and that the explanation of the action itself is made intelligible 
by such value judgements. This is because the success of a sympathetic exercise in 
placing oneself in the shoes of a historical player will depend on the acquisition of 
some understanding of this player’s moral categories. Such an understanding is not 
pursued by the anti-moralist. This second interpretation implies that the writing of 
history must be moral in some sense; one could not produce proper historiography, 
such as Hitler’s biography, without ever moralising.9 
Final remark
In the famous paper we have fleetingly examined, Berlin attacked 
approaches to history in which the existence of free will was somehow questioned, 
as if historical players succumbed, at times or always, to external forces beyond 
their control. He vehemently denied any speculation that history has a course, 
that mankind evolves towards progress, or that historians can discover historical 
patterns and identify laws of historical development. Although he was a libertarian, 
Berlin did not quite say that determinism, even when applied to the human sphere, 
is necessarily false. But he argued, as we have seen, that if determinism were indeed 
9. It should be noted that in Historical Inevitability Berlin’s thesis on the possibility of objective 
moral judgements is presupposed, but not developed.
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the case, then much of what we say about morality, responsibility and freedom 
would be nonsensical. As moral assessments play an important role in all rational 
activity, the truth of determinism would throw things in disarray, forcing us to 
radically revise language and concepts regarding our experience of life, past and 
present. The writing of ‘Historical Inevitability’ was motivated by a noble desire. 
As there seems to be no good reason to endorse determinism, and as we know that 
its falsity would preserve the dignity of free choice, it is preferable, believes Berlin, 
to ascribe historical players’ meaningful freedom. But the reasons he provides to 
support the view that determinism threatens the way we conceive of our moral 
categories is weakened by his omission of the case of compatibilism. 
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